
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
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An introduction to evidential reasoning for decision making under uncertainty: Bayesian and belief function perspectives

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ABSTRACT

The main purpose of this article is to introduce the evidential reasoning approach, a research methodology, for decision making under uncertainty. Bayesian framework and Dempster–Shafer theory of belief functions are used to model uncertainties in the decision problem. We first introduce the basics of the DS theory and then discuss the evidential reasoning approach and related concepts. Next, we demonstrate how specific decision models can be developed from the basic evidential diagrams under the two frameworks. It is interesting to note that it is quite efficient to develop Bayesian models of the decision problems using the evidential reasoning approach compared to using the ladder diagram approach as used in the auditing literature. In addition, we compare the decision models developed in this paper with similar models developed in the literature.

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1. Introduction

The main purpose of this paper is to introduce a general research methodology called evidential reasoning for decision making under uncertainty. We use the following two frameworks for managing uncertainties in the evidence: Bayesian framework and the framework of Dempster–Shafer (DS) Theory of Belief-Functions (Shafer, 1976). Evidential reasoning basically means reasoning with evidence. Such situations are quite common in the real world whether we deal with the medical domain, legal domain, or business domain such as auditing and information systems. Srivastava and his co-researchers have applied this approach to auditing and information system domains. They have used this approach to develop models for assessing risks such as audit risk, fraud risk, information security risk, information quality risk, information assurance risk, auditor independence risk, risks associated with sustainability reports, and many others (see. e.g., Srivastava and Shafer, 1992; Srivastava and Mock, 2010; Srivastava et al., 2007; Gao et al., 2010; Sun et al., 2006; Srivastava and Li, 2008; Bovee et al., 2003; Srivastava and Mock, 2000;

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Srivastava, Mock and Turner, 2009a,b; Rao et al., 2010; and Mock et al., 2009). Of particular interest to information system researchers would be the work of Sun et al. (2006) on information security, and of Srivastava and Li (2008) on system security and system reliability. Recently, Yang et al. (2010) have used evidential reasoning approach in multiple criteria decisions.

We first introduce the basics of the DS theory of belief functions in Section 2. We discuss the evidential reasoning approach and related concepts in Section 3. We demonstrate how specific decision models can be developed from the basic evidential diagrams under the two frameworks, Bayesian and DS theory of belief functions, in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Finally, Section 6 provides a conclusion and discusses potential research opportunities.

2. Dempster–Shafer theory of belief functions

Here we briefly introduce the DS theory and illustrate the use of Dempster's rule to combine several independent items of evidence pertaining to a variable or objective. The DS theory is based on the work of Dempster during the 1960's and of Shafer during the 1970's (Shafer, 1976, see also Dempster et al., 2008). There are three basic functions in the DS theory that we need to understand for modeling purposes. These are discussed below.

2.1. m-values, belief functions and plausibility functions

The basic difference between probability theory and DS theory of belief functions is the assignment of uncertainties, i.e., the probability masses. In the probability framework, we assign uncertainties to each state of nature. These states are assumed to be mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sum of all these uncertainties assigned to an individual state of nature is one. For example, consider a variable X. It has two values: "x," and "~x". Under the probability framework, we will have $P(x) \geq 0$ and $P(\sim x) \geq 0$, and $P(x) + P(\sim x) = 1$. However, in the DS theory of belief functions, we assign uncertainties not only to each state of nature, but also to all its proper subsets. These assigned uncertainties are called basic *belief masses* or *m-values* and they all add to one. These m-values are also known as the *basic probability assignment function* (Shafer, 1976). For the variable X, we can have $m(x) \geq 0$, $m(\sim x) \geq 0$, and $m(\{x, \sim x\}) \geq 0$, such that $m(x) + m(\sim x) + m(\{x, \sim x\}) = 1$. In general, if the variable has n-values, then m-values could exist for all the singletons, and all the subsets with two elements, three elements, and so on, to the entire frame. The entire frame consists of all the elements, i.e., all possible values of the variable.

Let us consider the following set of m-values pertaining to variable X based on a piece of evidence, say, E_1: $m_1(x) = 0.6$, $m_1(\sim x) = 0.1$, and $m_1(\{x, \sim x\}) = 0.3$. These m-values represent a mixed piece of evidence; 0.6 level of support that variable X is true; 0.1 level of support that variable X is not true; and 0.3 level of support is assigned to the entire frame {x, ~x}, representing partial ignorance. A positive evidence means that we have support only for 'x' and no support for its negation, i.e., $1 > m_1(x) > 0$ and $m_1(\sim x) = 0$. A negative evidence means we have support only for the negation, i.e., $m_1(x) = 0$, and $1 > m_1(\sim x) > 0$.

Two other functions are important for our purpose in the current discussion, *belief functions* and *plausibility functions*. By definition, *belief* in a subset or a set of elements, say O, is equal to the sum of all the m-values for the subsets of elements, say C, that are contained in or equal to the subset O. Mathematically, we can depict it as: $\mathrm{Bel}(O) = \sum_{C \subseteq O} m(C)$. Also, we know that $\mathrm{Bel}(O) + \mathrm{Bel}(\sim O) \leq 1$, i.e., belief in O and belief in ~O may not necessarily add to one, whereas in the probability theory $P(O) + P(\sim O) = 1$; i.e., the probability that O is true and the probability that O is not true always add to one. A belief of zero simply means that we lack the evidence, whereas a zero probability means impossibility. Ignorance in probability framework simply means assigning equal probability to all the state of nature. For example, if there are only two possible values of a variable X, say {x, ~x}, then ignorance means assigning 0.5 to each state, i.e., $P(x) = 0.5$, and $P(\sim x) = 0.5$. Under the DS theory, a complete ignorance is represented by a belief of zero in "x" and in "~x", i.e., $\mathrm{Bel}(x) = 0$, and $\mathrm{Bel}(\sim x) = 0$.

In addition, we can easily model partial ignorance under the DS theory, whereas it is not possible to express partial ignorance under the probability theory. For example, suppose the auditor wants to assess the effectiveness of a security system pertaining to a client's information system. One piece of evidence the auditor could collect would be to review the policies and procedures established by the company for the

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security of the information system. Suppose, based on the evaluations of the company's policies and procedures related to the system security, the auditor decides to assign a low level of support, say 0.3 on a scale of 0–1, that the information system is secure, represented by 'x', and a zero level of support that the system is not secure, represented by '~x'. This assessment can be expressed in terms of belief masses as: $m(x) = 0.3$, $m(\sim x) = 0$, and $m(\{x, \sim x\}) = 0.7$. The value 0.7 assigned to the entire frame $\{x, \sim x\}$ represents the partial ignorance. However, under the probability theory, once you assign 0.3 to the state that x is true, i.e., $P(x) = 0.3$, then by definition the result is $P(\sim x) = 0.7$. There is no way to represent partial ignorance under the probability theory.

Consider the earlier example of evidence E_1 with the corresponding m-values: $m_1(x) = 0.6$, $m_1(\sim x) = 0.1$, and $m_1(\{x, \sim x\}) = 0.3$. Based on this evidence alone, we have 0.6 level of support that "x" is true, 0.1 level of support that "~x" is true, and 0.3 level of support uncommitted. Using the definition of belief functions, we can write: $Bel_1(x) = m_1(x) = 0.6$, $Bel_1(\sim x) = m_1(\sim x) = 0.1$, and $Bel_1(\{x, \sim x\}) = m_1(x) + m_1(\sim x) + m_1(\{x, \sim x\}) = 0.6 + 0.1 + 0.3 = 1$.

Plausibility in a subset, O, is defined to be the sum of all the m-values for the subsets, C, that have non-zero intersections with O. Mathematically this can be expressed as: $Pl(O) = \sum_{O \cap C \neq \varnothing} m(C)$. Also, one can show that $Pl(O) = 1 - Bel(\sim O)$, i.e., plausibility in O is one minus the belief in not O. Using the above example of evidence E_1, we have $m_1(x) = 0.6$, $m_1(\sim x) = 0.1$, and $m_1(\{x, \sim x\}) = 0.3$. Thus, based on the evidence E_1, we have the plausibility in "x" to be $Pl_1(x) = \sum_{x \cap C \neq \varnothing} m_1(C) = m_1(x) + m_1(x, \sim x) = 0.6 + 0.3 = 0.9$, and the plausibility in "~x" to be $Pl_1(\sim x) = m_1(\sim x) + m_1(\{x, \sim x\}) = 0.1 + 0.3 = 0.4$.

Srivastava and Shafer (1992) tie the plausibility function to the audit risk. More precisely, the plausibility that an account is materially misstated is the belief function interpretation of the audit risk. In the above example, a plausibility of 0.4 that "~x" is true ($Pl_1(\sim x) = 0.4$) can be interpreted as the maximum risk that the variable X is not true, based on what we know now from evidence E_1. Using the Srivastava and Shafer definition of risk, Srivastava and Li (2008) define the systems security risk = Pl(~s) and the system security reliability = Bel(s), were 's' and '~s', respectively, represent that the system is secure and is not secure.

2.2. Dempster's rule of combination

Dempster's rule is used to combine various independent items of evidence bearing on one variable. For simplicity let us consider just two items of evidence with the corresponding m-values represented by m_1, and m_2. Using the Dempster's rule the combined m-values can be written as (Shafer, 1976):

$$m(O \neq \varnothing) = \sum_{O = C1 \cap C2} m_1(C1) m_2(C2) / K,$$

where K is the renormalization constant and is given by: $K = 1 - \sum_{C1 \cap C2 = \varnothing} m_1(C1) m_2(C2)$. The second term in K represents the conflict between the two items of evidence. If the conflict term is one, i.e., when the two items of evidence exactly contradict each other, then $K = 0$ and, in such a situation, the two items of evidence are not combinable. In other words, Dempster's rule cannot be used when $K = 0$. One can easily generalize Dempster's rule for n items of evidence (see Shafer, 1976 for details).

Let us consider the following sets of m-values based on the two items of evidence pertaining to the variable X: $m_1(x) = 0.6$, $m_1(\sim x) = 0.1$, and $m_1(\{x, \sim x\}) = 0.3$; and $m_2(x) = 0.4$, $m_2(\sim x) = 0.2$, and $m_2(\{x, \sim x\}) = 0.4$. The renormalization constant K for this case is: $K = 1 - [m_1(x)m_2(\sim x) + m_1(\sim x)m_2(x)] = 1 - [0.6 \times 0.2 + 0.1 \times 0.4] = 0.84$ and thus the combined m-values are:

$$\begin{aligned}
m'(x) &= [m_1(x)m_2(x) + m_1(x)m_2(\{x, \sim x\}) + m_1(\{x, \sim x\})m_2(x)] / K \\
&= [0.6 \times 0.4 + 0.6 \times 0.4 + 0.3 \times 0.4] / 0.84 = 0.6 / 0.84 = 0.71428 \\
m'(\sim x) &= \left[m_1(\sim x)m_2\left(\sim x\right) + m_1(\sim x)m_2(\{x, \sim x\}) + m_1(\{x, \sim x\})m_2(\sim x)\right] / K \\
&= [0.1 \times 0.2 + 0.1 \times 0.4 + 0.3 \times 0.2] / 0.84 = 0.12 / 0.84 = 0.14286 \\
m'\left(\left\{x, \sim x\right\}\right) &= m_1\left(\left\{x, \sim x\right\}\right) m_2\left(\left\{x, \sim x\right\}\right) / K = 0.3 \times 0.4 / 0.84 = 0.14286.
\end{aligned}$$

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


Fig. 1. Evidential reasoning and evidential diagram.

Thus, by definition, the belief that "x" is true after considering the two items of evidence is Bel′(x) = m′(x) = 0.71428, and the belief that "~x" is true is 0.14286, i.e., Bel′(~x) = m′(~x) = 0.14286. The plausibility that "~x" is true is 0.28572 (i.e., Pl(~x) = 1 − Bel(x) = 1 − 0.71428 = 0.28572). We see here that while the belief that X is not true is only 0.14286, the plausibility that it is not true is 0.28572, based on the existing evidence.

3. Evidential reasoning approach

As mentioned earlier, evidential reasoning simply means reasoning with evidence. This term was coined by SRI International (Lowrance et al., 1986, fn 1) to denote the body of techniques specifically designed for manipulating and reasoning from evidential information. Gordon and Shortliffe (1985) discussed this approach under the DS theory in the context of MYCIN that was being developed "to determine the potential identity of pathogens in patients with infections and to assist in the selection of a therapeutic regimen appropriate for treating the organisms under consideration (see Shortliffe and Buchanan, 1975, p. 237)." Pearl (1986) used this approach for analyzing causal models under the Bayesian framework.

There are two basic dimensions of evidential reasoning. One is the structure of evidence pertaining to the problem of interest. The second is the framework used to represent uncertainties in the evidence and the related calculus to combine the evidence for decision making. Fig. 1, represents a simple evidential diagram with three variables X, Y, and Z, represented by rounded boxes as variable nodes. These variable nodes may be interrelated through a logical relationship such as "AND" or "OR" or an uncertain relationship depicted by the relational node, R in a hexagonal box. The rectangular boxes in Fig. 1 represent items of evidence, or evidence nodes, pertaining to the variables to which they are connected.

In Fig. 1, we have one item of evidence for each variable and one item of evidence pertains to both X and Y. This diagram is a network in structure. If we did not have the evidence pertaining to both X and Y, then the diagram would be a tree. In general, we may have only partial knowledge about these variables because of the nature of evidence; the evidence may not be strong enough to provide conclusive evidence about the status of the variables. This partial knowledge can be modeled using various frameworks such as the fuzzy logic, the probability theory or the DS theory of belief functions. We will use the probability theory and the DS theory to model uncertainties in the evidence in our illustrations. The question is: what can we say about one variable having partial knowledge of all the variables and their interrelationship in the diagram? In reference to Fig. 1, what can we say about Z if we have partial knowledge about X, Y, and Z, based on the evidence available in the situation as depicted by the rectangular boxes in the figure, or what can we say about X having the partial knowledge about X, Y, and Z? The partial knowledge about these variables comes from the evidence that we may have.

In order to answer the question "What can we say about Z?", we need to propagate the partial knowledge (uncertainties) about X and Y, through the interrelationship R to variable Z and combine this knowledge with what we already know about Z from the evidence at Z. Or to answer the question, "What can we say about X having the partial knowledge about X, Y, and Z?" basically, we follow the same process. We propagate the partial knowledge (uncertainties) from Y and Z through the interrelationship R to X and combine this knowledge with what we already know about X through the evidence at X. In order to propagate uncertainties through an evidential diagram, we need to understand "vacuous extension," and "marginalization," and construct a Markov tree[1] from an evidential diagram. Vacuous extension basically means to extend the knowledge about a smaller node (a node consisting of fewer variables) to a bigger

[1] This topic is beyond the scope of this paper. Interested readers should see Srivastava (1995).

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


Fig. 2. Evidential diagram for one variable with four independent items of evidence in an audit context.

node consisting of a larger number of variables, without having any new information about additional variables in the larger node. The marginalization process is required when the knowledge about a node is propagated to a smaller node. This process is just opposite to the vacuous extension; one has to marginalize the knowledge from the state space of the node to the state space of the smaller node. We illustrate these processes in the following sections. Next, we describe how to construct an evidential diagram and propagate uncertainties through the evidential diagram for a problem of interest. There are three main steps:

Step 1 Develop an evidential diagram for the problem: An evidential diagram is a schematic representation of the variables, their interrelationships, and the items of evidence for the problem of interest (see Fig. 2, see also Sun et al., 2006, for more details). Fig. 2 represents an evidential diagram where one variable, Assertion[2] A, has four items of evidence. In this example, all the variables are assumed to be binary. However, the approach being discussed here is valid for multi-valued variables too.

Step 2 Representation of uncertainties in evidence: In this step we represent uncertainties in the evidence using the corresponding framework. For example, for the Bayesian framework we use probabilities and/or conditional probabilities to represent uncertainties in the evidence. In the DS theory, we use belief masses to represent uncertainties in the evidence. We express the uncertainties in the evidence pertaining to various variables and also express the uncertainties pertaining to the relationships used in the evidential diagram. In other words, for the Bayesian framework, we determine the probability information for each variable in the network based on the evidence, and express the interrelationships among the variables in terms of probabilities. Similarly for the DS theory, we determine the belief masses for each variable in the network based on the evidence pertaining to the variable, and express the interrelationships among the variables in terms of belief masses.

Step 3 Propagation of uncertainties in evidential diagram: Shenoy and Shafer (1990) have developed local computation techniques for propagating uncertainties in a network of variables, i.e., through the evidential diagram, for both the Bayesian framework and the DS theory. Under the local computation technique for the Bayesian framework, the partial knowledge about nodes, i.e., variables, is expressed in terms of probabilities and/or conditional probabilities known as probability potentials. Under the DS theory, this knowledge is expressed in terms of belief masses defined at these nodes.

Under the local computation technique, the propagation of partial knowledge about variables in the evidential diagram follows the following techniques: if the partial knowledge is being propagated from a smaller node (fewer variables) to a larger node (more variables) then this knowledge needs to be vacuously extended to the state space of the larger node. However, if the partial knowledge is propagated from a larger node to a smaller node then this knowledge needs to be marginalized onto the state space of the smaller node. We will demonstrate the use of these techniques in Section 3 for the Bayesian theory and

[2] SAS No. 31 (AICPA, 1980) defines management assertions as the "representations by management that are embodied in financial statement components." According to SAS 31, the management assertions consist of "Existence or Occurrence," "Completeness," "Valuation or Allocation," "Rights and Obligations," and "Presentation and Disclosure." AICPA has recently issued SAS No. 106 (AICPA, 2006), *Audit Evidence*, to supersede SAS No. 31, *Evidential Matter*. The new standard has been in effect since December 15, 2006.

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Section 4 for the DS theory. It should be noted that recent developments in propagating partial knowledge through a network of variables using local computations has made it possible to develop computer softwares such as Netica (http://www.norsys.com/) for the Bayesian, and Auditor Assistant (Shafer et al., 1988) and TBMLAB (Smets, 2005) for the DS theory to solve complex problems. Also, this development allows one to develop analytical models for complex problems (e.g., see, Srivastava et al., 2007, 2009).

4. Evidential reasoning under Bayesian framework

In this section, we use the Shenoy and Shafer (1990) approach to derive the traditional Bayesian audit risk models as derived by Leslie (1984) and Kinney (1984) using a ladder diagram approach. The reason we select to derive the traditional Bayesian audit risk model and not a model in the information systems domain is to demonstrate the value of evidential reasoning approach in comparison with the ladder diagram approach as used by Leslie (1984) and Kinney (1984) to derive the well established Bayesian models. The ladder diagram approach has limited applicability, especially if there are several interrelated variables. For example, in developing a model for assessing fraud risk under the Bayesian theory (Srivastava et al., 2009), we have three fraud triangle variables, Incentives, Attitude, and Opportunities. These variables, in general, can be considered to be interrelated. And each variable has multiple items of evidence. Such a situation cannot be handled by the ladder diagram approach for developing analytical models. Srivastava et al. (2009a) use the evidential reasoning approach to develop a fraud risk assessment model under the Bayesian framework and analyze the results by considering several scenarios.

4.1. Audit risk formula at the assertion level

Fig. 2 represents an evidential diagram for financial statement audit of an assertion of an account, say, Assertion A, on the balance sheet, depicted by a rectangular box with rounded corners. As commonly considered in the auditing literature, we assume that this assertion takes two values: "a=yes, the assertion A is true", and "~a=no, the assertion is not true." In the present case, we have four items of evidence pertaining to this assertion represented by rectangular boxes in Fig. 2. Evidence E_{IF} represents the evidence based on the inherent factors (IF), whether material misstatement is present or not. Evidence E_{IC} represents the evidence based on internal controls whether the account balance is materially misstated or not. Similarly, E_{AP} represents the evidence obtained from analytical procedures (AP) whether the account is materially misstated or not, and E_{TD} represents the evidence obtained from performing test of details of balance (TD). Under the Bayesian theory, the audit risk is defined to be the posterior probability, $P(\sim a|\ E_{IF}, E_{IC}, E_{AP}, E_{TD})$, that the assertion is not true given that we have partial knowledge about "Assertion A" from the four items of evidence, E_{IF}, E_{IC}, E_{AP}, and E_{TD}.

To derive the Bayesian audit risk formula, we need first to identify all the probability information (the partial knowledge) based on the four items of evidence about "Assertion A" and then combine them using the Shenoy and Shafer (1990) approach. Probability information on a variable is expressed in terms of what the Bayesian literature refers to as probability potentials, which essentially are probabilities or conditional probabilities associated with the variable based on the evidence. The following discussion provides the details of the steps involved in identifying and combining all the potentials at the variable and finally determining the posterior probabilities.

Step 1 *Identify all the probability potentials in the evidential diagram:* Based on the four items of evidence (see Fig. 2), we have the following probability potentials (Φ's) in terms of prior probabilities and conditional probabilities at "Assertion A".

$$\text{Potentials due to Inherent Factors :} \quad \Phi_{IF}=\begin{bmatrix}\varphi_{IF}(a)\\ \varphi_{IF}(\sim a)\end{bmatrix}=\begin{bmatrix}P_{IF}(a)\\ P_{IF}(\sim a)\end{bmatrix} \tag{1a}$$

$$\text{Potentials due to Internal Controls :} \quad \Phi_{IC}=\begin{bmatrix}\varphi_{IC}(a)\\ \varphi_{IC}(\sim a)\end{bmatrix}=\begin{bmatrix}P_{IC}(E_{IC}|a)\\ P_{IC}(E_{IC}|\sim a)\end{bmatrix} \tag{1b}$$

$$\text{Potentials due to Analytical Procedures :} \quad \Phi_{AP}=\begin{bmatrix}\varphi_{AP}(a)\\ \varphi_{AP}(\sim a)\end{bmatrix}=\begin{bmatrix}P_{AP}(E_{AP}|a)\\ P_{AP}(E_{AP}|\sim a)\end{bmatrix} \tag{1c}$$

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$$\text{Potentials due to Test of Details}: \Phi_{TD} = \begin{bmatrix} \varphi_{TD}(a) \\ \varphi_{TD}(\sim a) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} P_{TD}(E_{TD}|a) \\ P_{TD}(E_{TD}|\sim a) \end{bmatrix}. \tag{1d}$$

The above probability potentials are not necessarily normalized because, in general, $P(E|a) + P(E|\sim a) \neq 1$.

Step 2 *Combination of potentials:* According to Shenoy and Shafer (1990), the combined probability potentials at "Assertion A" are determined by point-wise multiplication of all the potentials at A, which is the process of multiplying each element of the potential by the corresponding element of the other potentials at the variable. This process yields the following potentials at "Assertion A".

$$\Phi_A = \Phi_{IF} \otimes \Phi_{IC} \otimes \Phi_{AP} \otimes \Phi_{TD} = \begin{bmatrix} P_{IF}(a)P(E_{IC}|a)P(E_{AP}|a)P(E_{TD}|a) \\ P_{IF}(\sim a)P(E_{IC}|\sim a)P(E_{AP}|\sim a)P(E_{TD}|\sim a) \end{bmatrix}, \tag{1e}$$

where the symbol ⊗ represents the point-wise multiplication of the potentials.

If we normalize the above potentials, we obtain the posterior probabilities obtained by using the Bayes' Rule, which is given by the following expression:

$$P(\sim a|E_{IF}E_{IC}E_{AP}E_{TD}) = \frac{P_{IF}(\sim a)P(E_{IC}|\sim a)P(E_{AP}|\sim a)P(E_{TD}|\sim a)}{P_{IF}(\sim a)P(E_{IC}|\sim a)P(E_{AP}|\sim a)P(E_{TD}|\sim a) + P_{IF}(a)P(E_{IC}|a)P(E_{AP}|a)P(E_{TD}|a)}. \tag{2}$$

In terms of the symbols used by Kinney (1984), we can rewrite the above equation as:

$$P(\sim a|E_{IF}E_{IC}E_{AP}E_{TD}) = AR = \frac{IR.CR.APR.DR}{IR.CR.APR.DR + (1 - IR)P(E_{IC}|a)P(E_{AP}|a)P(E_{TD}|a)}. \tag{3}$$

Eq. (3) is the general result derived by Kinney (1984) using the ladder diagram approach. In the above expression, AR represents the traditional Bayesian audit risk and IR, CR, APR, and DR, respectively, represent the inherent risk, control risk, analytical procedure risk, and the detection risk, as defined by Leslie (1984) and Kinney (1984). Leslie (1984), in his derivation, assumed $P(E_{IC}|a) = P(E_{AP}|a) = P(E_{TD}|a) = 1$, because internal controls, analytical procedures, and test of details will find no material misstatement if there is no material misstatement. However, Kinney (1984) assumed that these conditional probabilities may not necessarily be one.

One can write the audit risk formula in Eq. (2) in terms of the likelihood ratios (λ's) and prior odds (π_a) as:

$$P(\sim a|E_{IF}E_{IC}E_{AP}E_{TD}) = \frac{1}{1 + \pi_a\lambda_{IC}\lambda_{AP}\lambda_{TD}}, \tag{4}$$

where the prior odds are defined as $\pi_a = P_{IF}(a)/P_{IF}(\sim a)$, and the likelihood ratios as $\lambda_{IC} = P(E_{IC}|a)/P(E_{IC}|\sim a)$, $\lambda_{AP} = P(E_{AP}|a)/P(E_{AP}|\sim a)$, and $\lambda_{TD} = P(E_{TD}|a)/P(E_{TD}|\sim a)$. In general, the likelihood ratio represents the strength of the corresponding evidence (Dutta and Srivastava, 1993; Edwards, 1984). A value of $\infty > \lambda > 1$ means that the evidence is positive and provides support in favor of the variable. A value of $1 > \lambda \geq 0$ means the evidence is negative and supports the negation of the variable. A value of $\lambda = 1$ represents a neutral item of evidence. It simply means that there is no information in the evidence about the variable or that we have not performed the procedure, i.e., we have not collected the corresponding piece of evidence. An infinitely large value of λ (i.e., $\lambda \to \infty$) means that the evidence in support of the variable is so strong that the probability of the variable being true is 1.0. For example, as $\lambda_{IC} \to \infty$, $P(a|E_{IC}) \to 1$. A value of $\lambda = 0$ implies an infinitely strong negative item of evidence suggesting that it is impossible for the variable to be true. For example, if $\lambda_{IC} = 0$ then $P(a|E_{IC}) = 0$, and $P(\sim a|E_{IC}) = 1$.

Eq. (4) yields intuitively appealing results. For example, when we have no evidence about the variable "Assertion A" whether it is true or not true from any of the four sources, i.e., when $\pi_a = 1$, and $\lambda_{IC} = \lambda_{AP} = \lambda_{TD} = 1$, we get $P(\sim a|E_{IF}E_{IC}E_{AP}E_{TD}) = 0.5$, as expected (50–50 chance of the assertion being true or false when we have no information). In order to get the audit risk to be 0.05 or less, i.e., $P(\sim a|E_{IF}E_{IC}E_{AP}E_{TD}) \leq 0.05$, the term $\pi_a\lambda_{IC}\lambda_{AP}\lambda_{TD}$ in the denominator in Eq. (4) needs to be equal to or greater than 19. Eq. (4) can be used for audit planning purposes; depending on how strong the prior information (i.e., π_a) is and the strength of internal controls (i.e., λ_{IC}), one can plan the nature and extent of the audit procedures

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to achieve the desired level of combined strength (i.e., $\lambda_{AP}\lambda_{TD}$) from analytical procedures and test of details for "Assertion A" to achieve the desired audit risk.

5. Evidential reasoning under DS theory

The objective of this section is to show how evidential reasoning is performed under the DS theory. Similar to the Bayesian framework, we consider the same example and show how one can derive the audit risk models at the assertion level under the DS theory. Although we could have chosen an example from the information system domain such as information security (Sun et al., 2006) or system security and system reliability (Srivastava and Li, 2008), but for the convenience of the reader we decided to continue with the derivation of the audit risk model at the assertion level and compare the results with Srivastava and Shafer (1992).

5.1. Audit risk formula at the assertion level

Srivastava and Shafer (1992) developed the audit risk models at various levels of the account (assertion level, account level, and the balance sheet level) under the DS theory. These models were developed with the assumption that all the items of evidence were affirmative in nature, i.e., the items of evidence in their model provided support only in favor of the variables being true, and no support for the negation. Recently, Srivastava and Mock (2010) developed an audit risk model under the DS theory for the situation where, in general, all the items of evidence were assumed to be mixed, i.e., the evidence provided partial support in favor of the variable and partial support for its negation.

We consider the case depicted in Fig. 2 with one variable, "Assertion A", and four independent items of evidence, inherent factors (E_{IF}), internal controls (E_{IC}), analytical procedures (E_{AP}), and test of details (E_{TD}). The following sets of m-values represent the strength of evidence pertaining to the four items of evidence in Fig. 2:

$$\text{Inherent Factors} : m_{IF}(a), m_{IF}(\sim a), \text{and } m_{IF}(\{a, \sim a\}), \tag{10a}$$

$$\text{Internal Controls} : m_{IC}(a), m_{IC}(\sim a), \text{and } m_{IC}(\{a, \sim a\}), \tag{10b}$$

$$\text{Analytical Procedures} : m_{AP}(a), m_{AP}(\sim a), \text{and } m_{AP}(\{a, \sim a\}), \tag{10c}$$

$$\text{Detail Test of Balance} : m_{TD}(a), m_{TD}(\sim a), \text{and } m_{TD}(\{a, \sim a\}). \tag{10d}$$

We use the Dempster's rule to combine the above four items of evidence. Given that "Assertion A" is a binary variable, we use Equations 10–13 of Srivastava (2005), and obtain the following combined belief masses:

$$m(a) = 1 - \prod_i (1 - m_i(a))/K; m(\sim a) = 1 - \prod_i (1 - m_i(\sim a))/K; \text{and } m(a, \sim a) = \prod_i m_i(a, \sim a)/K, \tag{11}$$

where $K = \prod_i (1 - m_i(a)) + \prod_i (1 - m_i(\sim a)) - \prod_i m_i(a, \sim a)$, and $i \in \{IF, IC, AP, TD\}$.

As defined in Section 2, the total beliefs and plausibilities for "a" and "~a" can be derived from Eq. (11) as:

$$Bel(a) = 1 - \prod_i (1 - m_i(a))/K, Bel(\sim a) = 1 - \prod_i (1 - m_i(\sim a))/K, \text{where } i \in \{IF, IC, AP, TD\} \tag{12a}$$

$$Pl(a) = \prod_i (1 - m_i(\sim a))/K, \text{and } Pl(\sim a) = \prod_i (1 - m_i(a))/K, \text{where } i \in \{IF, IC, AP, TD\}. \tag{12b}$$

Using the Srivastava and Shafer (1992) definition of the audit risk as the plausibility, Pl(~a), that "Assertion A" is not true, one obtains the following expression for the audit risk:

$$\text{Audit Risk} = Pl(\sim a) = \prod_i (1 - m_i(a))/K, \text{where } i \in \{IF, IC, AP, TD\}. \tag{13}$$

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Under the special case when all the items of evidence are assumed to be affirmative, as assumed by Srivastava and Shafer, i.e., assuming $m_{IF}(\sim a) = m_{IC}(\sim a) = m_{AP}(\sim a) = m_{TD}(\sim a) = 0$, and $m_{IF}(a) = 1 - IR$, $m_{IC}(a) = 1 - CR$, $m_{AP}(a) = 1 - APR$, $m_{TD}(a) = 1 - TD$, and $m_{IF}(\{a,\sim a\}) = IR$, $m_{IC}(\{a,\sim a\}) = CR$, $m_{AP}(\{a,\sim a\}) = APR$, and $m_{TD}(\{a,\sim a\}) = TD$, Eq. (13) reduces to:

$$\text{Audit Risk at the Assertion Level} = AR = IR.CR.APR.TD. \quad (14)$$

Eq. (14) is what Srivastava and Shafer obtained for the audit risk, AR, at the assertion level. Also, Eq. (14) is similar to the SAS 47 Audit Risk model (AICPA, 1983), where IR, CR, APR, and DR represent, respectively, the inherent risk, control risk, analytical procedure risk, and test of detail risk at the assertion level. By definition, IR, CR, APR, and DR represent the plausibility of "~a" based on the corresponding evidence, i.e., $Pl_{IF}(\sim a) = IR$, $Pl_{IC}(\sim a) = CR$, $Pl_{AP}(\sim a) = APR$, and $Pl_{TD}(\sim a) = DR$.

6. Conclusion and potential research opportunities

In this paper we have introduced the evidential reasoning approach for decision making under uncertainties. We have used two frameworks, the Bayesian framework and the DS theory of belief functions, for modeling uncertainties. A brief introduction to belief functions is also provided. We have used the evidential reasoning approach to demonstrate the process of deriving analytical formulas for the audit risk at the assertion level under the two frameworks. The results are compared with similar results obtained by previous researchers. It is interesting to note that the evidential reasoning approach makes it easier to develop analytical models for decision making under uncertainties for complex problems.

In terms of research opportunities, there are lots of interesting problems, both theoretical and empirical in nature, especially in information system domain that one could investigate using the evidential reasoning approach. Some examples of such problems are: How effective and reliable is the accounting information system of a company? How effective are the internal accounting controls in an accounting system? Answers to these questions come down to determining the assertions and sub-assertion relevant to the problem of interest, interrelationships among these assertions and sub-assertions, and determining the corresponding items of evidence to assess whether these assertions are true or not. Essentially, this involves creating the appropriate evidential diagram and using the appropriate framework for representing uncertainties and then using the evidential reasoning approach to make the decision. Another area of interest in information system domain is the assessment of trust, trust for regular business transactions, and trust for ecommerce transactions. Again, such a problem involves determining the basic assertions of trust, i.e., what are the basic assertions and sub-assertions that constitute trust and what kinds of relationships exist between these assertions and sub-assertions, and ultimately what is the structure of evidence? Again, such questions involve both theoretical and empirical studies.

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